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Pharming Out Data: A Proposal
for Promoting Innovation and
Public Health through a Hybrid
Clinical Data Protection Scheme
ABSTRACT

The pharmaceuticalindustry, one of the largest industries in the
world, is rapidly becoming globalized. Clinical trials, which are
required for drugs to be approved for human use, are increasingly
performed outside of the pharmaceuticalcompany's home country in an
attempt to save money. This is mainly due to drug development's steep
costs, and the high risks involved in an industry where only 12 percent
of products that begin development ever make it to market. In order to
help offset these risks and encourage innovation, many countries offer
clinical trial data certain protections through patents, market
exclusivity, or trade secret protection. However, regulationsand clinical
dataprotection often do not align between the originatorcountry and
the location of the clinical trial. This leads to confusion and undermines
the goals of providing clinical data protection. Additionally, providing
too much protection to test data can negatively affect consumers, who
will not be able to access cheaper generic versions of drugs. While it is
commonly accepted that clinical dataprotection must be standardized
on a global level, it is less clear what level and type of protection is
appropriate. This Note proposes a hybrid system of clinical data
protection that offers one year of data exclusivity, followed by a fouryear period of cost sharing, during which generic competitors must pay
a fee to rely on the originator company's data. Such a scheme would
properly balance the need to encourage pharmaceutical companies to
undertake the risky business of innovating with the need to provide easy
access to affordable medications.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION TO DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND THE
PROBLEM OF CLINICAL DATA PROTECTION .....
...........
DEFINING CLINICAL DATA AND EXPLORING THE
INCREASING NEED FOR HARMONIZED CLINICAL DATA
PROTECTION
..........................................

III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF CLINICAL DATA PROTECTION......

A.
B.

General Methods of Clinical DataProtection.......
Single-Country Statutes, Regulations, and

Guidelines
C.

1470

1477
1483

1484

..................................
1487

The Trans-PacificPartnership

1469

..................

1488

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1470

D.
E.

[VOL. 51:1469

NAFTA: Do We Hafta? (and Other Free
.........................
Trade Agreements)
The Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)...........

IV.

THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF COMPREHENSIVE
..................
CLINICAL DATA PROTECTION.........

V.

SOLUTION

A.
B.
C.

.............................................

1.

1492
1495

1500

Data Exclusivity as the Gold Standardfor
1501
.....................
Clinical DataProtection
A Hybrid Approach: Pro Rata Data Exclusivity
1503
..........................
and Cost Sharing
1506
How Do We Get There?......................

CONCLUSION............................................

VI.

1489

1508

INTRODUCTION TO DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF
CLINICAL DATA PROTECTION

The pharmaceutical industry is a formidable beast, both in the
United States and worldwide. In 2014, an estimated 48.9 percent of
people in the United States had used at least one prescription drug in
the past thirty days.' This represents a marked increase from just two
decades earlier, when only 37.8 percent of survey respondents
2
Globally,
answered the same question in the affirmative.
pharmaceutical revenues exceeded $1 trillion for the first time in 2014,
and have continued to increase accordingly, with US-based
pharmaceutical companies accounting for approximately half of the
market revenues. 3 In 2017, the world pharmaceutical market value
4
was estimated to be $1.2 trillion.
However, drug development is also a highly risky business. It can
cost anywhere from $650 million to $2.7 billion to put a drug on the
market in the United States.5 When as few as one in ten thousand

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2016:
1.
(2017),
293
IN
HEALTH
TRENDS
LONG-TERM
ON
CHARTBOOK
WITH
(archived
[https://perma.cc/269T-52SJ]
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalhus/husl6.pdf
Sept. 15, 2018).
2.
Id. The cause of this increase has not been definitively determined.
Facts,
STATISTA,
3.
Global Pharmaceutical Industry-Statistics &
https://www.statista.com/topics/1764/global-pharmaceutical-industry/ (last visited Oct.
11, 2018) [https://perma.cclKXH6-QFKS] (archived Aug. 25, 2018) [hereinafter
STATISTA].
Ellen't Hoen, Wrapping Up 2017-some noteworthy medicines law and policy
4.
events,
MEDICINES
LAW
&
POLICY
(Dec.
31,
2017),
https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2017/12/wrapping-up-2017-some-noteworthymedicines-law-and-policy-events/ [https://perma.cc/YTV9-8T93] (archived Sept. 15,
2016).
Compare Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Datain
5.
InternationalIntellectualPropertyLaw: The Casefor a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5 (Winter 2009) (citing figures between $800 million and $1
billion per approved drug), with Richard Harris, R&D Costs for Cancer Drugs are Likely
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compounds eventually becomes a marketable product-only twentytwo novel drugs were approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in 2016 6-it would be smarter to buy a lottery ticket. Further,
although pharmaceutical-company expenditures on research and
development continue to grow, only 30 percent of the drugs that do
make it to market recoup enough money to meet or exceed the average
cost of development. 7
To truly understand the costs involved in getting a drug to market,
it is also important to understand the drug development process.8 The
first step is researching in a laboratory to discover new compounds or
find new uses for drugs that are already approved.9 Molecules that
show a potential therapeutic indication move on to the preclinical
research stage, the goal of which is to determine the maximum dosage
that can be given to humans without toxicity, if such a dose exists.' 0
Preclinical research can be conducted in vitro, but is most commonly
done using animals such as mice, rats, dogs, and monkeys.' The FDA
requires a specific set of preclinical studies before drugs may be tested
on humans.12
After the requisite preclinical studies are conducted and
maximum safe dosages are determined, pharmaceutical companies file

Much Less than Industry Claims, Study Finds, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Sept. 11,
2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/09/11/550135932/r-dcosts-for-cancer-drugs-are-likely-much-less-than-industry-claims-study-finds
[https://perma.cc/J3H6-FQSD] (archived Sept. 15, 2018) (citing one study that found it
costs $650 million to develop a new cancer drug, and also pointing out that the
pharmaceutical industry asserts the cost to develop a new drug is $2.7 billion).
6.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2016 NOVEL DRUGS SUMMARY 2 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Druglnnovation/U

CM536693.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJC2-8Z89] (archived Sept. 15, 2018).
7.
OLIVER GASSMANN ET AL., LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: TRENDS
AND DRIVERS FOR GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2 (2004).

8.
For ease, the drug development process is explained through the lens of the
regulations and procedures in the United States. This is because American-based drug
companies represent over half of the industry's revenue, and therefore the United States'
policies are the most widely applicable. See STATISTA, supra note 3. The drug
development process in general is often similar in other developed countries, where most
pharmaceutical companies are located, although not identical.
9.

See

The

Drug

Development Process,

U.S.

FOOD

&

DRUG

ADMIN.,

https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/default.htm (last updated Jan. 4,
2018), [https://perma.cc/3S3V-D3WZ] (archived Sept. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Drug
Development Process].

10.
Id. Because the drugs are tested on animals in the preclinical stage, the FDA
recommends that the maximum tolerated dose in animals be at least fifty times the
expected clinical dose in humans. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
M3(R2) NONCLINICAL SAFETY STUDIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF HUMAN CLINICAL TRIALS
AND
MARKETING
AUTHORIZATION
FOR
PHARMACEUTICALS
4
(2010),

https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm073246.pdf
[https://perma.ccTF7B-D4KM] (archived Sept. 15, 2018).
11.

See Animals in Science/Research, NEW ENG.

ANTI-VIVISECTION

SOC'Y,

https://www.neavs.org/researchbiomedical
(last
visited
Oct.
11,
2018)
[https://perma.ce/4XGX-GPTW] (archived Oct. 11, 2018); Step 2: Preclinical Research,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm4056
58.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/PF3G-YJAL] (archived Oct. 11, 2018)
12.
Step 2: PreclinicalResearch, supra note 11.
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13
an Investigational New Drug (IND) application with the FDA. In the
application, the developer must include data from preclinical research,
including information about toxicity and manufacturing, plans for
future human clinical trials, and data from any prior human research
involving the drug.1 4 If the FDA is satisfied that the drug meets federal
standards, the pharmaceutical company is allowed to proceed to
5
clinical trials, where it administers the drug to humans.'
Phase I clinical trials are small in size and short in duration, and
often involve healthy volunteers so scientists can assess safety, proper
dosage, and potential side effects.1 6 Approximately 70 percent of drugs
advance to Phase II clinical trials, where several hundred patients with
the target condition are given the drug for a few months to two years,
depending on the particular trial.' 7 The purpose of these trials is to
determine whether the compound has the desired effect on the target
8
disease, and if there are any new side effects in the target population.'
Thirty-three percent of molecules move on to Phase III clinical
trials, which are designed to assess long-term effects of the drug in the
target population." Accordingly, these trials usually last between one
and four years, with an average trial length of approximately twenty
months. 20 After Phase III trials, the drug developer may file a New
Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA, seeking approval to market the
drug to the public. 2 1 The NDA includes reports on all studies and data
collected up to the point of filing, as well as proposed labeling, patent
information, and data from studies that were conducted outside of the
United States. 2 2 The last phase of clinical research, Phase IV, assesses
safety and efficacy in several thousand volunteers with the indicated
condition. 2 3
Although consumers often take for granted that their medications
will be safe and will not cause excessive side effects, some may
nevertheless view such extensive drug-development requirements as
burdensome and overly expensive. However, a quick examination of
the history behind the advent of clinical trials makes it clear why close
regulation of pharmaceutical testing is necessary.
The birth of the modern clinical trial scheme goes back to the
1960s, when a German pharmaceutical company internationally

Id.
13.
14.
Id.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.; see also Lisette Pregelj et al., Changes in Clinical Trial Length, 14
20.
NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 307, 308 (2015).
Drug Development Process, supra note 9.
21.
Id.
22.
23.
Id.
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marketed a sedative called thalidomide. 24 The product was advertised
as "completely safe," even if used by pregnant women.2 5 Doctors began
to prescribe thalidomide not only as a sedative, but also as a treatment
for morning sickness in expectant mothers, an off-label use discovered
by an Australian physician. 26 This turned out to be a tragic mistake.
Despite the manufacturer's assurances, thalidomide was far from safe
for pregnant women; in fact, it interfered with fetal development and
caused severe birth defects, most commonly resulting in babies born
with shortened or absent limbs. 2 7 The clinical trials for thalidomide
were cursory at best-they involved over a thousand physicians
administering the drug to twenty thousand patients, and did not
require that the patients be tracked after taking the medication.2 8
Prior to these events, the United States had passed the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938, which required drug
manufacturers to show that a drug was safe, and to submit an
application to the FDA before the drug could be put on the market. 29
The statute was enacted in the wake of another catastrophe where a
Tennessee drug company marketed Elixir Sulfanilamide, a product
chemically similar to antifreeze that killed over one hundred people.3 0
However, the FDCA had a major flaw: if the FDA did not act on an
application within a certain time period, it would automatically become
approved, and therefore the requirement of proving safety did not serve
as a sufficient gatekeeper to keep unsafe medicines off the market.3 1
The United States Congress was spurred to address this problem
in the wake of the devastation caused by thalidomide. It enacted the
Kefauver Harris Amendments to the FDCA, which required drug
manufacturers to prove the efficacy and safety of a product before the
FDA would approve it.32 The Amendments specified that evidence of
effectiveness must be based on "adequate and well-controlled clinical
studies conducted by qualified experts."3 3 Further, they corrected the
gap in the FDCA, giving the FDA only 180 days to approve a new drug

24.
Katrin Weigmann, The Ethics of Global Clinical Trials, 16 EMBO REPS. 566,
566 (2015).
25.
Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and
Regulation, HELIX MAG. (July 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edularticle/
thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation [https://perma.cc/FT8Z-L2HZ]
(archived Aug. 25, 2018).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA
CONSUMER MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2006, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/Product

Regulation/ucm2017809.htm [https://perma.cc/RPQ8-BFC4] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
30.
Id.
31.
See id. (explaining that the Act's automatic approval mechanism was not
effective in keeping unsafe drugs off the market).
Id.
32.
33.
Kefauver-HarrisAmendments Revolutionized Drug Development, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm322856.
htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ND35-ZAF5] (archived Aug. 26,
2018).
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application, at which point the application would be considered
denied. 34 The legislative bodies of the European Union (EU) and the
United Kingdom (UK), among others, also enacted statutes overseeing
35
clinical trials in the wake of the thalidomide scandal.
It is important to regulate the actual clinical trials for ethical
reasons as well. The greatest illustrator of this need is a forty-year
study conducted by the United States Public Health Service that began
in 1932, titled the "Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro
Male." 3 6 Researchers told the six hundred subjects-all poor, black

men from rural Alabama-that they were being treated for "bad blood,"
a term used at the time to describe ailments such as anemia or
fatigue. 3 7 In reality, the government planned to observe the effects of
38
syphilis and study the body after it succumbed to the disease. Despite
promises from the researchers, the patients never received the
necessary treatment, even after scientists discovered penicillin could
effectively combat syphilis in 1947.39

In the wake of the Tuskegee study, the United States enacted the
National Research Act, which requires researchers to obtain voluntary
consent from all persons taking part in studies or clinical trials and
40
provides for oversight of any study using human subjects.
Internationally, the World Medical Association put forth the
Declaration of Helsinki as a statement of ethical principles for
41
conducting medical research with human patients. These actions
represent an international consensus that extensive regulation of
clinical trials and drug development is necessary given the ethical,
health, and safety concerns inherent in the process.
But everything costs money, and tight regulation makes drug
development an extremely expensive industry. In the United States, a
42
single clinical trial may cost anywhere from $1 million to $53 million.
The entire drug development process may run a pharmaceutical

Id.
34.
See Medicines Act 1968, ch. 67 (UK); Council Directive 65/65/EEC on the
35.
Approximation of Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action
Relating to Proprietary Medicinal Products, 1965 O.J. SPEC. ED. 022.
U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: The Tuskegee
36.
Timeline, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/

timeline.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/92T7-53AL] (archived Aug. 26,
2018).
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
40.
Id.
41.
Sandra L. Alfano, Conducting Research with Human Subjects in
International Settings: Ethical Considerations, 86 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 315, 318
(2013).
42.
Aylin Sertkaya et al., Key Cost Drivers of PharmaceuticalClinical Trials in
the United States, 13 CLINICAL TRIALS 117, 117 (2016).
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company between $650 million and $2.7 billion. 4 3 The increasing cost
of clinical research worldwide has serious implications. On the whole,
the pharmaceutical industry has become more risk averse and,
therefore, less willing to develop novel compounds or specialized drugs
with smaller potential markets. 44 Clinical research facilities are
similarly wary, carefully selecting the types of clinical trials they will
take on in order to avoid putting the center in a deficit. 45 The
pharmaceutical industry is therefore constantly looking for ways to
combat the effects of rising costs and incentivize continued
innovation.46
One way to manage the financial burden of the drug development
process is to relocate clinical trials to developing countries, where the
price of renting research facilities, hiring medical staff, and recruiting
test subjects is significantly lower. 47 The ability to move clinical trials
overseas is facilitated by the fact that the pharmaceutical industry,
like much of the world, has become increasingly globalized in the last
few decades. 48 Another way to ease the burden is to offer protection to
data generated by originator pharmaceutical companies for a set
period of time. 49 This prevents other companies from profiting from
data they did not originally produce, at least for a certain amount of
time, giving the originator company an opportunity to recoup costs
without significant competition.
However, the decreased up-front financial burden of conducting
clinical trials in lower-cost countries is often offset by an increased
regulatory burden.5 0 To maximize profits, multinational drug
companies want to market their products in as many countries as

43.
Harris, supra note 5 (explaining that the pharmaceutical industry often cites
much higher figures than those put forth by studies conducted by consumer groups or
physicians).
44.
AYLIN SERTKAYA ETAL., EASTERN RESEARCH GRP., EXAMINATION OF CLINICAL
TRIAL COSTS AND BARRIERS FOR DRUG DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (July 25, 2014),

https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/examination-clinical-trial-costs-and-barriers-drugdevelopment [https://perma.cc/NFA2-XN7J] (archived Sept. 15, 2018), [hereinafter
EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP].

45.

Id.

46.
See, e.g., TODD D. CLARK, THE CASE FOR GLOBALIZATION: ETHICAL AND
BUSINESS
CONSIDERATIONS
IN
CLINICAL RESEARCH
3-5
(July
21,
2009),
https://www.acrohealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Case-for-

Globalization FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cclR3U7-S6QR] (archived Sept. 18, 2018)
(advocating for clinical trials in emerging countries as a way to reduce costs while
continuing to innovate).
47.
See Paul R. DeMuro & John E. Steiner, Overview of Privacy Requirements
and Compliance Issues in International Clinical Trials, Presentation at Health Care
Compliance Association Research Compliance Conference (Oct. 18-20, 2009),
https://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/O/PDFs/Resources/ConferenceHandouts/Research%

20Compliance%2OConf/2009/203H1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y93-3S2Q] (archived Sept.
15, 2018) [hereinafter HCCA Presentation].
48.
See Seth W. Glickman et al., Ethical and Scientific Implications of the
Globalizationof ClinicalResearch, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 816, 816 (2009).
49.
See Reichman, supra note 5, at 4. For an in-depth discussion of the different
methods of clinical data protection, see infra Part III.
50.
See Reichman, supra note 5, at 2.
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possible. However, there is no widespread global harmonization of
requirements for conducting clinical trials, collecting and reporting
5 1
data, or protecting that data once it is generated. Because of this,
countries often have extensive review mechanisms to ensure clinical
trials conducted in foreign countries comply with all the necessary
52
requirements of the home country before approving a drug. There are
also problems that arise from reconciling different methods of clinical
data protection, which can hinder the process of marketing a drug
when regulations between countries do not align. These delays and
difficulties largely counteract the financial benefits of globalization of
clinical trials.
Incentivizing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is
extremely important. Given the high cost of drug development, many
pharmaceutical companies choose not to focus on developing medicines
that treat diseases that affect only a small portion of the population
53
and therefore have small prospective markets. Even if such drugs are
discovered, they are often not tested because the low potential sales
54
cannot justify the cost of development. But just because a drug may
not make a large profit does not mean the disease at issue does not
deserve to be treated.
However, the need to promote development of novel drugs and
reward pharmaceutical companies for engaging in research is
counterbalanced by ethical and public health concerns stemming from
overprotection. If clinical data is afforded too much protection, it is
extremely difficult for generic versions of medications to make it to
market, which means access to affordable drugs is significantly
hindered.5 5 Prohibiting generic manufacturers from relying on clinical
data from the originator company may also lead to unnecessary
duplication of precinical and clinical research; this raises serious
questions about the ethics of needlessly subjecting people and animals
56
to trials regarding products that may have significant side effects.
Additionally, because pharmaceutical companies are, understandably,
profit-motivated corporations, protecting clinical data more than is
truly necessary to incentivize innovation does not lead to cost savings
for consumers; in fact, it may actually lead to companies that hold a
monopoly on a particular market sector continually inflating prices due

See Kassa Ayalew, FDA Perspective on International Clinical Trials,
51.
Presentation (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/training/clinicalinvestigat
ortrainingcourse/ucm378499.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSS4-6R4W] (archived Oct. 11, 2018).
Glickman, supra note 48, at 817.
52.
G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data
53.
Required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 6, 11 (2003).
Id. at 9.
54.
Lisa Diependaele et al., Raising the Barriers to Access to Medicines in the
55.
Developing World-The Relentless Push for Data Exclusivity, 17 DEVELOPING WORLD
BIOETHICS 11, 12 (2017).
56.
See id. at 13.
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to lack of competition.57 There is also a concern that many of these
public health issues disproportionately
affect poorer, less
industrialized nations, who may not have equal bargaining power with
which to negotiate international standards for clinical data
protection. 58
To balance these competing, valid considerations, clinical data
protection must be standardized globally so as not to undermine its
goals of incentivizing innovation and decreasing costs for
pharmaceutical companies. However, the method of protection must
also be more flexible, and take into consideration exactly what amount
of safeguarding of data is necessary to achieve innovation while still
allowing the policy goals of economic and social development in less
industrialized countries, and public health considerations of access to
affordable medication.
Part II of this Note presents a brief explanation of why clinical
data protection is an issue worth exploring, points out the recent trend
towards globalization in the pharmaceutical industry, and explains
why that trend has created an urgent need to harmonize how countries
protect clinical data generated within their borders. Part III explores
the different methods and instruments currently used to protect
clinical data in various countries. Part IV delves into the benefits and
drawbacks of comprehensive protection of clinical data, leading into
Part V, which proposes a hybrid scheme that combines a set period of
data exclusivity with a period of cost sharing in order for generic
companies to access such data.

II. DEFINING CLINICAL DATA AND EXPLORING THE INCREASING NEED
FOR HARMONIZED CLINICAL DATA PROTECTION

Clinical trial data encompasses any information generated during
the preclinical and clinical testing processes. 5 9 The United States
requires extensive data from applicants in order to demonstrate to the
FDA that the benefits of a drug outweigh its possible side effects. 60 This
requirement applies even if the compound was previously approved by
another country's government. 6 1 Other developed countries, such as
Japan and most of the members of the EU, mandate similar amounts
of data in order to achieve drug approval. 62

57.
See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of PrescriptionDrugs in the
United States, 316 JAMA 858, 863 (2016) (noting that the justifications for high drug
prices in the United States have weak foundations).
58.
Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org.,
Address at the WHO-WIPO-WTO Technical Symposium on Sustainable Development
Goals (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2018/tehnical-symposiumsdgs/en/ [https://perma.cclQDD8-99J8] (archived Sept. 15, 2018).
59.
Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 6.
60.
Id.; see also infra Part II.
61.
Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 6.
62.
Id.
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Given that consumers in developed countries constitute the
majority of potential revenue for pharmaceutical companies, it makes
sense that most drug developers, regardless of where they are located,
generate massive amounts of clinical data with the goal of eventually
63
marketing their products in the United States and the EU.
Pharmaceutical companies spend a great deal of money to produce this
data: in the United States, clinical trials can cost anywhere from $1
million to $53 million, and drug developers must conduct several
clinical trials before a drug may be marketed. 64 In order to encourage
investment in generating clinical data and make it easier to recover
the heavy costs of drug development, data from preclinical and clinical
research are often protected from potential producers of generic
versions of the drug for a set amount of time, allowing the originator
company to ensure it will recover its expenses. 65
Another way of managing the financial burden of the drug
development process is to relocate clinical trials to developing
66
Most large
countries, where costs are significantly lower.
pharmaceutical companies today have research facilities in multiple
countries-of the 171 companies that developed new molecular entities
approved by the FDA between 1992 and 2004, approximately 60
percent were designated as "multinational," meaning they had
research facilities in more than two countries. 67 Many of these
multinational companies conduct their preclinical and clinical testing
in a single country, but use the data generated from those trials to
obtain regulatory approval in multiple countries, thus allowing them
68
to market a drug internationally without duplicating testing. This is
partially because of the cost savings, and partially because of the
ethical issues that arise from unnecessarily exposing animals and
69
humans to repeated testing for the same drug.
As more trials cross borders, international clinical data
protections have become an increasingly important issue. 70 Of the over
286,000 clinical trials currently under the supervision of the FDA,
more than half are conducted at least partially outside of the United
States.7 1 In 2009, it was estimated that over half of the studies

See id.
63.
Sertkaya, supra note 42, at 117.
64.
Reichman, supra note 5, at 4. See also infra Part III for a more detailed
65.
explanation of the different methods of clinical data protection.
See HCCA Presentation, supra note 47.
66.
Salomeh Keyhani et al., US PharmaceuticalInnovation in an International
67.
Context, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1075, 1076-77 (2010).
Daria Kim, Protecting Trade Secrets Under InternationalInvestment Law:
68.
What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.

228, 235 (2016).
69.
Id. at 235 n.42.
70.
See HCCA Presentation, supranote 47.
71.
Nat'l Inst. of Health, Trends, Charts, and Maps, CLINICAL TR1ALS,
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018)
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/resources/trends#wrapper
[https://perma.cclWCE8-MVP9] (archived Aug. 26, 2018). Numbers are accurate as of
time of publication. Id.
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submitted to the FDA contained at least some data generated in a
foreign country.7 2
The move abroad has been exacerbated as pharmaceutical
companies based in developed countries have realized that it is not
feasible to keep up with the current pace of medical research without
lowering costs and expanding the pool of potential clinical trial
subjects.7 3 Pharmaceutical companies believe it is not possible to
continue to be profitable conducting expensive trials in developed
countries that contain only 15 percent of the world's population. 74 The
entire business in general is costly and high risk, with only 10 to 20
percent of drugs that make it to clinical trials ultimately receiving FDA
approval. 75 While at one point running a clinical trial in a western
European country was significantly less expensive than conducting
trials in the United States, this is no longer the case, which has
prompted drug development firms to look for new locales for their
clinical research. 76 Conducting clinical trials in developing countries
such as Estonia, Hungary, and Poland not only keeps costs down, but
also increases availability of treatment-naive patients-those patients
who have never undergone treatment for a particular illness.7 7 Such
populations are attractive subjects because they have not built up any
resistance to the medications being tested.7 8 Meanwhile, these
countries often still provide access to high-quality investigational sites
and large, specialized hospitals.7 9
Some of the biggest cost drivers in pharmaceutical research
include data management; patient recruitment and retention;
physician and administrative staff salary; site recruitment, retention,
and monitoring; and general overhead costs. 8 0 Unsurprisingly, most of
these factors are significantly more expensive in western Europe and
the United States than they are elsewhere.8 1
Difficulties with patient recruitment and retention, which have
become common in the United States and western Europe, can cause
costly delays in clinical trials. 82 In 2000, time costs accounted for
approximately half of the overall cost of developing a new drug, so it is
understandable that pharmaceutical companies are constantly seeking

72.

CLARK, supra note 46, at 7.

73.
See id.
74.
See id. at 8.
75.
HCCA Presentation, supra note 47.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.; see also Elizabeth Boskey, What Does it Mean to be Treatment Narve?,
VERYWELL (June 28, 2017), https://www.verywell.com/treatment-naive-3132655
[https://perma.cc/T5ZL-2H36] (archived Aug. 26, 2018) (giving a more in-depth analysis
of the significance of treatment-naive patients).
78.
Boskey, supra note 77.
79.
See HCCA Presentation, supra note 47.
80.
81.

EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 44, at 3-6 to 3-7.
Id. at 4-25 (explaining how cost has driven many drug sponsors to move the

bulk of their research overseas).
82.
Id.
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ways to reduce the timeline of clinical trials. 83 Eastern Europe and
Asia have an advantage in patient recruitment because countries such
84
as India, China, and Russia have large populations. Clinical trials
have extensive eligibility requirements that rule out a large portion of
potential subjects, so a larger pool means it is significantly easier to fill
a trial. 85 This is especially true when looking for participants in Phase
II clinical trials and beyond, which require numerous people with a
specific disease. 86 One study indicates that recruitment in such
populous, less-developed countries could be accomplished in about half
the time it would take to recruit in the western world.8 7 This could lead
to clinical trials costing 50-60 percent of what they would cost if they
88
were performed in the United States or other developed countries.
Additionally-and controversially-patients in developing countries
are commonly treatment-naive, due to poverty or inability to access
medications. 89 On a more general level, poverty may mean the
population is more willing to participate in a clinical trial due to a
pressing need for some source of income, or because it is the only way
90
to receive adequate medical care.
Physicians and administrative staff are also more expensive in the
United States and western Europe than in countries with lower
average incomes.9 1 Further, there are more available sites for clinical
trials in large countries such as India and China, decreasing the time
92
and effort it takes to locate an appropriate facility. Once a site is
found, the cost of retaining it and paying for accompanying overhead
93
costs is often lower in less developed countries.
There are many benefits to clinical trials being conducted within
a country's borders, such as income for its citizens, profit for its
government, and increased technological knowledge through
technology transfer. 94 As such, several countries without a large

Glickman, supra note 48, at 816-17. Time costs are calculated as the
83.
difference between the out-of-pocket cost of drug development and the fully capitalized
cost of developing the same drug, which accounts for fixed expenses that accrue over time
such as research facilities and employee salaries and benefits. For an explanation of how
these costs are calculated, see Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New
Estimates of DrugDevelopment Costs, 22 J. HEALTH EcON. 151, 166-68 (2003).
84.

See EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 44, at 4-25.

85.
86.

Id.
See Drug Development Process, supra note 9.

87.

EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 44, at 4-25.

Dinesh C. Sharma, India Pressured to Relax Rules on Clinical Trials, 363
88.
LANCET 1528, 1528 (2004).
Glickman, supra note 48, at 819.
89.
Id. at 818 (noting that in some places, compensation for participating in a
90.
clinical trial may be greater than the average patient's yearly wages).
See EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 44, at 4-25.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
See Matthew Howes, Attractiveness of conducting clinical trials outside the
94.
https://www.centerwatch.cominews2017),
(July 24,
CENTER WATCH
U.S.,
online/2017/07/24/attractiveness-conducting-clinical-trials-outside-u-s/
[https://perma.cclTA89-MSV5] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
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market share in the pharmaceutical industry have begun to offer
incentives to drug companies.9 5 India offers a 200 percent tax
deduction for all research and development done in the country. 96
Australia has a tax-incentive program that makes clinical trials up to
60 percent more cost effective, and also boasts a government-sponsored
cash rebate for research and development.97 Singapore allows
pharmaceutical companies access to numerous high-tech research
institutes that the government has invested significant capital to
build.9 8 These incentives have visibly impacted the location of clinical
trials: for clinical trials sponsored by the twenty largest US-based
pharmaceutical companies, the number of non-US countries serving as
trial sites more than doubled between 1997 and 2007.99
Despite the benefits of conducting pharmaceutical research in
developing countries with large populations, if regulations between the
pharmaceutical company's home country and the country in which the
research is conducted do not align, the goal of decreasing costs is
undermined. Conflicting regulations often lead to difficulties in
compliance during clinical trials, which in turn can lengthen the
duration of clinical trials, negating one of the main benefits of
performing clinical trials offshore. 10 0 After the trials are completed,
there may be additional delays in getting the results accepted by the
pharmaceutical company's home country.10 1 Individual countries often
have extensive review mechanisms to ensure that clinical trials
conducted in foreign countries comply with all the necessary
requirements of the home country before approving a drug. 10 2 In the
United States, the FDA reviews all clinical trials conducted in a foreign
country to ensure they adhere to certain FDA regulations before
accepting the data. 103
This review is especially necessary because poorer, developing
countries feel significant pressure to relax rules on clinical trials

95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.

98.

SAUWAKON

RATANAWIJITRASIN,

DRUG REGULATION AND INCENTIVES

FOR

INNOVATION: THE CASE OF ASEAN 18 (2009).
99.
Glickman, supra note 48, at 816.
100.

See EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 44, at 4-11.

101. See Glickman, supranote 48, at 821 (noting that delays result from the home
country regulatory agency's lack of information about important aspects of clinical trials
conducted outside of the home country).
102. Greg Minisman et al., Implementing Clinical Trials on an International
Platform: Challenges and Perspectives, 13 J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 1, 2 (2012).
103. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA
STAFF: FDA ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN CLINICAL STUDIES NOT CONDUCTED UNDER AN

IND (2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm
294729.pdf [https://perma.ccl63PT-WDLA] (archived Sept. 15, 2018); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN CLINICAL STUDIES (2001),

https://www.fda.gov/downloads/regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucml24939.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7GMA-75PB] (archived Sept. 15, 2018).
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conducted within their borders in order to draw in more business.10 4
India is an illustration of this: in 2004, the Indian pharmaceutical
industry actively lobbied the government to decrease regulations
surrounding clinical trials because the industry wanted capital-rich
European and North American pharmaceutical companies to place
their trials in India. 0 5 This practice not only raises ethical concerns,
but also makes review in the home country even more essential to
ensure the data generated meets the standards required for
approval.1 06

Then there are difficulties that arise from different methods of
clinical data protection, which can hinder the process of marketing a
drug when regulations between countries do not align. Different
countries choose to provide such protection through different
instruments, such as statutes, data-sharing agreements between
countries, free trade agreements, and treaties; many countries use
some combination of these types of data protection, which makes the
regulatory landscape even more difficult to navigate. Additionally,
these instruments may use different methods of protecting clinical
data, either through patent law, trade secret protection, or data and
marketing exclusivity. 0 7 As previously detailed, these processes are
long and costly, often causing delays in profitability for pharmaceutical
companies and diminishing the benefits of outsourcing clinical trials to
foreign countries.xos
In response to increased globalization and its attendant problems,
governments have moved towards more harmonized rules regarding
how clinical trials should be conducted, what data should be collected,
and how the data should be analyzed and reported. 0 9 For example, the
International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements
for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) brings the regulatory
authorities of several countries together with members of the
pharmaceutical industry itself, and promulgates the ICH Guidelines
in the areas of quality, safety, and efficacy with which all members
must comply."1 0 The ICH also sets international quality standards in

104. See Matthew Anderson, FDA Abandons Declaration of Helsinki for
International Clinical Trials, THE Soc.
MED. PORTAL (June 1, 2008),
http://www.socialmedicine.org/2008/06/01/ethics/fda-abandons-declaration-of-helsinkifor-international-clinical-trials/ [https://perma.cc/F9W9-YUHL] (archived Aug. 26,
2018).
105. Sharma, supra note 88.
106. See id.
107. See WILLIAM CHRISTIAN ET AL., CITIZENS AGAINST GOVERNMENT WASTE, THE
TRANS-PACiFIC PARTNERSHIP TRADE AGREEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 (Nov.
2015), https://www.cagw.org/sites/default/files/users/user98/TPPA%20and%20IP%20
Issue%20Brief%2oWeb%2OEdition.pdf [https://perma.ccBJ24-K4NR] (archived Sept.
15, 2018); Rebecca Choi, Increasing Transparency of Clinical Trial Data in the United
States and the European Union, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 521, 523 (2015); Tom
C. W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 912 (2012).
108. See supra Part II.
109. See HCCA Presentation, supra note 47.
110. Mission, INT'L CONF. ON HARMONISATION, http://www.ich.org/about/mission.
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the form of Good Clinical Practices (GCP), which regulate the
investigators, the trial sponsors, and the clinical trial protocols.' 1
While these efforts move clinical data protection towards
globalization, and are therefore helpful in lessening the regulatory
burden on clinical trials conducted outside of the home country, there
are still problems to be solved. Not all countries are party to the ICH
Guidelines and the GCPs-major players in the pharmaceutical
industry, such as China and India, are not members, and no developing
countries have adopted the guidelines-and therefore their
effectiveness is somewhat lessened.11 2 Even in member countries, the
Guidelines and GCPs may merely supplement existing regulations,
meaning that there is not true harmonization." 3 Most significantly,
how clinical trial data is protected and shared has not yet been made
uniform on a global scale.

III. THE CURRENT STATE OF CLINICAL DATA PROTECTION

As detailed in Part II, there must be some way to ease the heavy
burden of paying to get a drug to market, or else the incentive to
innovate will continue to be undermined as costs rise. 1 14 The most
common solution to this problem is to offer certain protections to data
generated by originator pharmaceutical companies for a set period of
time." This prevents other companies from profiting from data for
which they did not shoulder the financial burden of initial drug
development-at least for a certain amount of time-and gives the
originator company an opportunity to recoup costs without significant
competition.
As stated above, countries can choose whether to provide
protection through statutes that apply to all research conducted within
a country's borders, data-sharing agreements between two countries,
free trade agreements, large-scale international treaties, or a

html (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cclZ9A5-FPAP] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
Regulatory members of the ICH include the United States, the EU, Japan, Canada,
Switzerland, Brazil, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea. Members and Observers, INT'L
CONF. ON HARMONISATION, http://www.ich.org/about/members-observers.html
(last

visited Aug. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3VD5-6ZLM] (archived Aug. 26, 2018). Industry
members include the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Associations, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America, Biotechnology Innovation Organization,

International Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Association, and World Self-Medication
Industry. Id.
111. See generally INT'L CONF. ON HARMONISATION, ICH HARMONISED TRIPARTITE
GUIDELINES: GUIDELINE
FOR GOOD
CLINICAL PRACTICE
(June
10,
1996),

https://www.ich.org/fileadmin/PublicWebSite/ICH-Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E6/E
6-RlGuideline.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B5Y-7SBL] (archived Sept. 1, 2018) [hereinafter
ICH GUIDELINES].

112.
113.
114.
115.

Members and Observers, supra note 110.
See generally ICH GUIDELINES, supra note 111.
See supra Part II.
Reichman, supra note 5, at 25-28.
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combination of mechanisms. Some of these instruments offer
protection through patent law.1 16 Others classify the clinical data as a
1 17
Still others grant protection
trade secret that must be protected.
through data and marketing exclusivity provided separately from
patent protections.1 1 8
Complicating matters even further is that many countries use
these types of data protection in combination. As an example, the
United States, in addition to being a party to the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA)" 9 and the Agreement on Trade-Related
0
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),12 also has many
federal statutes and regulations regarding data protection.121 Utilizing
multiple data protection methods not only undermines the
harmonization efforts of the larger, multinational instruments, but
also contributes to the regulatory burden and costly delay for
pharmaceutical companies.
A. General Methods of Clinical Data Protection
Regardless of the instrument used to provide protection to clinical
trial data, there must always be some method of protecting the data.
The most common means of protection are various areas of intellectual
property law, including patents, trade secrets (internationally known
22
as "undisclosed data" or "undisclosed information"1 ) and offering data
and market exclusivity. For the purpose of ease, these different
mechanisms will be explained by examining processes in the United
States-the protections are generally the same internationally, but
some of the nuances may differ.
Utility patents may be granted to any new and useful process,
23
machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter.' A patent

116. See Choi, supra note 107, at 523.
117. See id. at 522-23; Lin, supra note 107, at 941.
118. CHRISTIAN, supra note 107, at 3-4.
119. United States-Mexico-CanadaAgreement Text, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REP., https://perma.cclM3YZ-974N (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S5BV83RD] (archived Oct. 11, 2018) [hereinafter USMCA]. This agreement replaces the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),

OFFICE

OF

THE

U.S.

TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE,

https://ustr.gov/trade-

(last
agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta
visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2HD4-GNTJ] (archived Aug. 26, 2018)
[hereinafter USTR NAFTA]. For more information on NAFTA and the transition to
USMCA, see infra Part III.D.
120. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
121. Examples include the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Orphan Drug Act,
discussed in Part III.
122. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 120, art. 39.
123.

General information concerning patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE

https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information2015),
(Oct.
concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/KV9G-A6J9] (archived Aug. 26, 2018) [hereinafter
USPTO General Information].
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may be applied for and issued at any time as long as the requirements
are met, regardless of a drug's approval status. 12 4 Patents generally
grant the holder the right to exclude others from making, using,
25
selling, or importing the patented drug.s
This means a patent holder
could prevent a generic company from putting the same
pharmaceutical on the market, even if the generic manufacturer
generated its own data rather than relying on the originator company's
data.1 2 6

'

While patent protection is very comprehensive, there are also
drawbacks. Most importantly, patents only protect the product itself,
not the data generated in testing the product.12 7 This means that while
patents may keep a competitor from directly copying a chemical
compound's structure, or the method of producing the drug, they do not
offer any shield to the actual data, and are therefore an incomplete way
of addressing the problems associated with clinical data disclosure.
Additionally, once granted, patents only endure for a set amount of
time; in the United States, the patent term is twenty years from the
date the patent application was filed.125 Given the long period of
development before regulatory approval and sale, the average
medication in the United States loses over six years of its patent life
before it makes it to market.129 In the international context, patent
protections generally only exist within the country that granted the
patent, which creates issues given the globalization of the drug
development process.13 0 This is exacerbated by the fact that developing
countries historically have not recognized intellectual property rights
and have only provided weak protection when intellectual property
rights do exist.' 3
Trade secrets consist of certain information-a formula, pattern,
complication, device, method, process, or design-not generally known
by outsiders through which a business can obtain an advantage over
competitors.1 3 2 The categories of information that can be considered

124.

Id.

125.

Wael

Armouti,

Test

Data

Protection:

Different

Approaches

and

Implementation in Pharmaceuticals,20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 267, 278 (2016).
126. See id.
127. USPTO General Information, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. Francis H. Spiegel, Jr., The Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and
Development: An Industry Perspective, in THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL

TECHNOLOGY 181 (1991).
130. USPTO General Information, supra note 123.
131. Charles Vorndran, Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Protection from
U.S. Law Through NAFTA, 3 L. & Bus. REV. AMERICAS 103, 126 (1997).
132.

Trade

Secret

Policy,

U.S.

PATENT

&

TRADEMARK

OFFICE,

https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-startedlinternational-protection/trade-secretpolicy (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4ENX-SJJ7] (archived Aug. 26, 2018)
[hereinafter USPTO Trade Secrets]. It is important to note that trade secrets as such are
not recognized on an international level. Internationally, the equivalent to a trade secret
is "undisclosed information," and is often defined using Article 39 of the TRIPS
Agreement. Stephanie Zimmerman, Secret's Out: The Ineffectiveness of Current Trade
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trade secrets are fairly broad, meaning that this protection is readily
and easily available.1 3 3 Trade secrets are protected without any
procedural formalities, which means there is no registration or
paperwork needed for clinical data to be considered a trade secret, and
the protection can theoretically exist in perpetuity.1 34 However, a
trade-secret holder is only protected from unauthorized disclosure and
use of the data, not from any independent discovery by another party
or from disclosure by the holder.' 35
Protection through data and marketing exclusivity has become
more common in recent years, especially given that it was designed
intentionally to promote new drug innovation while still allowing
public access to generic drugs.1 3 6 This form of protection allows the
original drug developer to enjoy a competition-free market by delaying
or prohibiting approval of competitor drugs; in this way, it is often
considered a subset of trade secret protection.' 3 7 For data exclusivity
purposes, it does not matter where the clinical testing was conductedrather, it is the decision of the national regulatory agency, such as the
FDA in the United States, whether to grant the originator company
exclusive approval for a set period of time.138 Typically, exclusivity will
only attach upon approval of a drug that meets certain
requirements. 3 9 A drug developer may hold patents on its product and
still be eligible for exclusivity, and the terms of patent protection and
140
exclusivity may or may not run concurrently.

Secret Law Structure and Protectionfor Global Health, 29 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 777,
783 (2011).
133. USPTO Trade Secrets, supra note 132.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm#
2018)
28,
Feb.
visited
(last
What is thedifferencebetween-patents-a
[https://perma.cc/46FC-NLQZ] (archived Aug. 26, 2018) [hereinafter FDA FAQ].
137. See Armouti, supra note 125, at 269; USPTO General Information, supra note
123.
138. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 120, art. 39.3 ("Members, when
requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of
agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of
undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort,
shall protect such data against unfair commercial use."); INT'L FED'N OF PHARM. MFRS.
& Ass'NS, DATA EXCLUSIVITY: ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES (July

2011), https://www.ifpma.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IFPMA 2011_Data_
Exclusivity-EnWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADB2-M2JG] (archived Oct. 11, 2018)
(discussing the domestic laws of several states governing data exclusivity); INT'L FED'N
OF PHARM. MFRS. & Ass'Ns, ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE

ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 2 (2000), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/
en/DataExclusivity-2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM37-A5H3] (archived Oct. 11, 2018).
139. USPTO General Information, supra note 123. These requirements may
include: the product must be a new chemical entity; the data must be unpublished;
generating the data involved considerable effort; and the data are submitted to get
marketing approval. Armouti, supra note 125, at 279.
140. FDA FAQ, supra note 136.
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B. Single-Country Statutes, Regulations, and Guidelines
Like any other industry, one way the pharmaceutical industry is
regulated is through statutes, administrative regulations, or
guidelines enacted by a single country's government that apply only
within that country. While they allow countries to regulate their own
economies, instruments that only have effect in one country do not
solve the problem of regulatory delay or confusion.
In the United States, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for a fiveyear period of exclusive marketing rights in clinical trial data, starting
from the date the compound is approved by the FDA, if the product
contains an active ingredient not previously approved. 14' An originator
company may also be eligible for an additional three years of protection
if it can demonstrate a new indication for the same drug, or if it
develops a new dosage form.1 4 2 These protections are independent of
patent rights. 143 After this period expires, competitors can rely on the
data of the original company, provided they can demonstrate that the
products are bioequivalent; alternatively, the would-be competitor can
perform its own testing to obtain the necessary data during the period
of protection.1 44 The statute promotes innovation by offering protection
for pharmaceutical companies working on drugs unlike anything
currently on the market, while also recognizing a need to avoid
unnecessary costs that result from duplicative testing.1 45 The Council
of the European Community also adopted a similar regulation that
prohibits reliance on the data of the originator company for six years,
or ten years if the product is considered to be a "high-technology
medicinal product."1 46 Further, fifteen EU member states have
statutes providing for protection of clinical data in the same way,
varying slightly in the term the protection endures.1 4 7
One advantage of statutes and regulations is that they can be
designed to address a specific problem, and can be put into force with
relative ease. One example is the Orphan Drug Act in the United
States, which was enacted in response to the fact that, given the high
cost of drug development, many pharmaceutical companies choose not
to focus on developing medicines that treat diseases that affect only a
small portion of the population and therefore have small potential
markets.1 48 This holds true even if the drug is targeting a well-known
disease, such as ALS or Huntington's disease.1 4 9 Even if such drugs are

&

141. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012); Reichman, supra note 5, at 7.
142. John A. Vernon et al., Exploration of Potential Economics of Follow-On
Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16 B.U. J. Scl.
TECH. L. 55, 62 (2010).
143. Id.; Reichman, supra note 5, at 6.
144. Skillington & Solovy, supranote 53.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 11, 49.
148. Id. at 9-10.
149. Id. at 9.
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discovered, they are often not tested because the low potential sales
1 50
The
cannot justify the costs of the precinical and clinical trials.
normal protections afforded by patents are sometimes insufficient to
1 51
The Orphan Drug
promote testing of these so-called "orphan drugs."
Act accordingly provides seven years of exclusive marketing rights for
the originator company during which it can theoretically recoup its
investment.1 5 2
C. The Trans-PacificPartnership
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was first proposed by thenPresident Barack Obama in 2009 with the goal of bringing countries
bordering the Pacific Ocean closer together to address issues with
global trade. 5 3 The members would be twelve countries with a
collective population of 800 million that are responsible for
approximately 40 percent of world trade.1 54 Under the TPP, data used
in bringing biologic drugs to market would have been afforded five
years' protection-although the US pharmaceutical industry actually
55
For nonbiologic
lobbied for the data to be protected for twelve years.'
pharmaceuticals, the agreement would have offered five to eight years
of protection for undisclosed test data. 5 6 The parties believed this
length of time would incentivize innovation while still allowing patient
access to cheaper versions of the drugs after a reasonable amount of
time.' 5 7 The data protected would have included all clinical trial data
relevant to a new medicine's safety and efficacy.' 5 8 In order to enforce
these protections, the TPP would have required all signatory countries

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Kevin Granville, What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explainedwhat-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6BNA-DFTU] (archived
Aug. 24, 2018); Dan Stanton, TPP: Five years data protection for biologics in US-Asia
trade deal, BIOPHARMA REPORTER (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.biopharmareporter.com/Article/2015/10/05/TPP-Five-years-data-protection-for-biologics-in-USAsia-trade-deal [https://perma.cc/6HSU-VQ5T] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
154. TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, BBC (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.bbc.comlnews/business-32498715 [https://perma.ccflUN7G-P9LB] (archived
Aug. 24, 2018) [hereinafter BBC TPP]. The member countries were to be the United
States, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Japan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, and New Zealand. Id.
155. Stanton, supra note 153.
156. Carlos A. Primo Braga, TPP: The New Gold Standardfor Intellectual Property
Protection in Trade Agreements?, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2017, 10:35 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/eastwest-center/tpp-the-new-goldstandard-b 9544428.html [https://perma.cc/SE64-ULK5] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
157. Stanton, supra note 153.
158. Yanbai Andrea Wang, Will the Trans-Pacific Partnership hinder access to
medicine?, STANFORD LAw SCH. BLOGS (Nov. 19, 2015), https://law.stanford.edu/
2015/11/19/will-the-trans-pacific-partnership-hinder-access-to-medlicine-part-il
[https://perma.cc/6HLC-VNNN] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
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to conform their own domestic laws and policies to the terms of the
TPP. 15 9 This agreement represented the most comprehensive
protection of clinical data in history.
After five years of negotiations, all twelve parties signed the
agreement in February 2016.160 However, as of today, only two
countries-Japan and New Zealand-have actually ratified the
TPP.1 61 In order to go into effect, the TPP must be ratified by at least
six of the parties that together account for 85 percent or more of the
member countries' economic output.1 62

The agreement seemed to be on life support during the 2016 US
presidential election, when both candidates ran on the platform that
the TPP was not a good deal for the United States, and that it either
needed to be renegotiated or abandoned altogether. 163 Then-candidate
Donald Trump rallied his supporters around the idea that
international trade agreements would only lead to increased job
outsourcing while limiting competition. 164 As to the data-protection
component of the agreement, Trump and other critics feared that
comprehensive data protection would raise prices for pharmaceuticals
in developed countries by spreading higher standards for patent
protections to other, less developed nations. 16 5
Holding true to his campaign promise, President Trump signed a
statement formally abandoning the deal on his first day in office. 1 66
This effectively killed the TPP, as the requirement that the ratifying
nations make up at least 85 percent of the group's economic output
likely cannot be satisfied without the United States.1 6 7
D. NAFTA: Do We Hafta?168 (and Other Free Trade Agreements)
Free trade agreements arise when two or more countries negotiate
and agree upon terms to regulate trade among them, including tariffs
and duties on imports and exports.1 69 NAFTA-which actually began

159.

Trans-Pacific

Partnership

Agreement,

ELEC.

FRONTIER

FOUND.,

https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QS6R-TVGF]
(archived Aug. 24, 2018).
160. BBC TPP, supra note 154.
161. Vernon Small, Government ratifies TPP as Bill English heads to Japan for
trade talks, STUFF (May 11, 2017), https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/92466121/govern
ment-ratifies-tpp-as-bill-english-heads-to-japan-for-trade-talks [https://perma.cclCQ8ZNPD6] (archived Oct. 11, 2018).
162. BBC TPP, supranote 154.
163. Granville, supra note 153.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. BBC TPP, supra note 154.
168. Creative title attributed to Susan Dobrof & John Sutter, NAFTA: Do We
Hafta?, 53 OR. ST. B. BULL. 23 (1993).
169. Kimberly Amadeo, Free Trade Agreement, Their Impact, Types, and
Examples, THE BALANCE (updated Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/freetrade-agreement-types-and-examples-3305897 [https://perma.cc/5JES-TWQS] (archived
Oct. 11, 2018); What Is the North American Free Trade Agreement?, THE BALANCE
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as a bilateral free trade agreement between Canada and the United
States, and was later expanded to include Mexico in 1994-is the
17
largest free trade agreement in the world. o This agreement
essentially eliminated tariffs on products that were imported and
1 71
exported between the member states.
Under NAFTA, when clinical data is submitted to a member
state's government in order to obtain regulatory approval for a new
chemical entity, that data must be protected against disclosure "except
where the disclosure is necessary to protect the public or unless steps
are taken to ensure the data is protected against unfair commercial
use."1 7 2 Additionally, a pharmaceutical company attempting to
produce a generic version of a drug cannot rely on preexisting test data
73
These
for at least five years from the time of first market approval.'
protections run independently of patent protections.174
While these regulations may seem fairly uniform and
straightforward, that is not necessarily the case. For example, the
agreement does not define what constitutes "unfair commercial use,"
giving member countries the opportunity to interpret the agreement
differently, leading to uncertainty as to how to comply with the
75
Additionally, NAFTA does not require its member
requirement.s
176
Article
states to have the exact same protection for clinical data.
1702 of the agreement states that any party "may implement in its
domestic law more extensive protection of intellectual property rights
than is required under this Agreement, provided that such protection
is not inconsistent with this Agreement." 7 7 This means that any of the
three members may have statutes, regulations, or other international
agreements that require more stringent clinical data protection; this
178
also clouds the regulatory landscape between these countries.
In October 2018, following President Trump's threats to end the
United States' participation in NAFTA, the parties reached an
agreement on a revised North American trade deal, the United States-

(updated Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.thebalance.cominafta-definition-north-americanfree-trade-agreement-3306147 [https://perma.cc/537H-DHWA] (archived Aug. 24, 2018)
[hereinafter What is NAFTA?].
170. Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 39, 51
(2006); What is NAFTA?, supra note 169.
171. USTR NAFTA, supranote 119.
172. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S.-Mex., art. 1711.5, Dec. 17,
1992 [hereinafter NAFTA]; Reichman, supra note 5, at 15 n.60.
173. Reichman, supra note 5, at 13.
174. Id.
175. See NAFTA, supra note 172, art. 1711 (setting forth requirements for data
protection without defining the term "unfair commercial use").
176. Raymundo Valdes & Maegan McCann, Intellectual Property Provision in
Regional Trade Agreements: Revision and Update 13 (World Trade Org. Econ. Research
and Statistics Div., Working Paper No. ERSD-2014-14, 2014).
177. NAFTA, supra note 172, art. 1702.
178. See Reichman, supra note 5, at 12 (discussing various forms of clinical data
protection enacted in different countries).
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Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).x 7 9 While the bulk of the changes
centered around trade, there were some amendments to the clinical
data protection regime.1 80 For example, the new deal increases the
period of exclusivity for biologic drugs from eight years to ten years.' 8
However, many of the clinical data protection provisions remain the
same under the new agreement, including using data exclusivity as the
mechanism of protection, and retaining the five-year period of
protection for nonbiologic drugs. 182 USMCA likely won't go into effect
until 2020 after signature and ratification by the parties'
legislatures.18 3

In general, free trade agreements provide great advantages to the
originating pharmaceutical company, often for long periods of time.1 84
This tends to benefit developed countries with the ability to sink
significant resources into pharmaceutical research. 8 5 Even when the
provisions of the agreement are the same as NAFTA's, the protections
can be much more one-sided when one party has a significantly higher
ability to produce pharmaceuticals than the other. For example, the
US-Morocco free trade agreement has an "ever-greening" clause, which
continually extends the patent protections for existing drugs if the
originator company can demonstrate a "new use" for the drug.1 86 This
provision benefits the United States, where most of the drug companies
are located, and ensures that Morocco does not have access to generic
versions of drugs for a potentially unlimited period of time.' 8 7 Another
example is an agreement between the United States and Singapore
that has essentially identical protections to NAFTA,
but

179. Heather Long, U.S., Canadaand Mexico just reached a sweeping new NAFTA
deal.
Here's
what's
in
it.,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
1,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/01/us-canada-mexico-just-reachedsweeping-new-nafta-deal-heres-whats-it/?noredirect=on&utm-term=.7143fdc88ef5
[https://perma.cc/QV3H-NQZA] (archived Oct. 11, 2018).
180. Id.
181. The USMCA: What Does it Mean for Patents and the Pharmaceutical
Industry?, GOWLING WLG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insightsresources/articles/2018/usma-what-it-means-for-patents-and-pharmaceutical/#

ftn

refl0 [https://perma.cc/3L8Y-4VRU] (archived Oct. 11, 2018).
182. USMCA, supra note 119. Article 20.F.13 provides "[i]f a Party requires, as a
condition for granting marketing approval for a new pharmaceutical

product, the

submission of undisclosed test or other data concerning the safety and efficacy of the
product, that Party shall not permit third persons, without the consent of the person that
previously submitted such information, to market the same or similar product on the

basis of that information; or the marketing approval granted to the person that
submitted such information, for at least five years from the date of marketing approval

of the new pharmaceutical product in the territory of the Party." Id.
183. Long, supra note 179. Because USMCA is not currently in effect, and because
the agreements are very similar with respect to clinical data protection, this Note will
continue to refer to NAFTA as the free trade agreement currently in force in North
America.
184. See generally Reichman, supra note 5 (discussing how free trade agreements
can protect clinical trial results).
185. See Cho, supra note 170, at 61 (discussing how many poor countries have
failed to profit from the multilateral trading system).
186. Id. at 74.
187. Id.
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disproportionately benefits the United States due to its more
188
This problem is not
significant presence in drug development.
unique to the United States-the European Union Free Trade
Association has attempted to force ten-year clinical data protection
requirements on south African countries, although this provision was
ultimately rejected by the African countries due to fears that it would
89
put their access to life-saving medications at risk.'
E. The Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS)
In the late 1980s, intellectual property was becoming an
90
increasingly important factor in international trade.o Large players
in this arena began to realize the need for more centralized regulation
in order to correct potential imbalances in trade due to unequal
intellectual property systems. 1 9' They sought to incorporate the
principles of their individual statutes into a comprehensive
international agreement.1 9 2 Thus began the multilateral trade
negotiations known as the Uruguay Round that spanned from 1986 to
1994 and ultimately culminated in TRIPS, as well as the creation of
3
the World Trade Organization (WTO).19
Negotiations commenced with delegates from about twenty
94
countries, and later expanded to include thirty countries.1
Approximately half of the countries represented were large,
industrialized nations with a significant presence in international
95
In general, the
trade, while the rest were developing countries.
developing countries advocated for more limited data protection,
emphasizing the need for flexibility in order to continue economic and
social development at home.1 96 However, the industrialized countries'

&

188. Id. at 55; see Brian Cimbolic, The Impact of Regional Trade Areas on
InternationalIntellectual Property Rights, 48 IDEA 53, 58 (2007).
189. Cimbolic, supra note 188, at 60-61.
190. Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-eltif-e/agrm7-e.htm (last visited Aug. 24,
2018) [https://perma.cclL9FN-UVNJ] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
191. Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalizationof Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
ENT. L.J. 929, 939 (2002).
192. See Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 12; Zimmerman, supra note 132,
at 783.
193. The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/the
wtoe/whatis_e/tife/fact5_e.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.ccl6YQW8725] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
194. Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of
Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 507 (2005) [hereinafter Gervais State of Play].
195. Id.
196. Id. at 508. Specifically, a number of representatives proposed an alternative
version of TRIPS to the one that ended up being adopted that reflected the policy values
of public health and development. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba,
Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Uruguay initially put forth this alternate
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desire for stringent protection of intellectual property, including
clinical data, won in the end-TRIPS is the most comprehensive
multinational agreement regarding intellectual property and is
responsible for introducing intellectual property regulation into
international trade.19 7 In the end, the parties to the agreement were
all 128 members of the newly-minted WTO. 1 98 Today, there are 164
members of the WTO, representing over 96 percent of global trade and
global gross domestic product.1 9 9

Article 39 of the agreement protects both undisclosed data and
data that has been submitted to the government or a government
agency; the text is worth reproducing here in full. 2 00
In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as
provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect
undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to
governments or governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3.

Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by
others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices so long as such information: is secret in the sense that it is not, as a
body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally
known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally
deal with the kind of information in question; has commercial value because it is
secret; and has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial
use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except
where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that
the data are protected against unfair commercial use.

2 01

The foundation for the agreement's clinical data protection is
found in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, which requires all
member states to provide "effective" protection against unfair
competition. 202 In order to ensure adequate protection from unfair
competition, parties to TRIPS must protect undisclosed test data or
other proprietary clinical data against unfair commercial use or

proposal, with Pakistan and Zimbabwe later endorsing the more relaxed iteration as
well. Id. at 508 n.18.
197.

See id. at 507; Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note

190.
198. Accession in perspective, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/acc_e/ebtcourse e/clslpl-e.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
3VD2-6CUV] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
199. Id. A comprehensive list of current WTO members can be found at Members
and Observers, supra note 110.
200. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 120, art. 39.
201. Id.
202. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 13.
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"Unfair

commercial use" is typically understood as use by a competitor that
gives that competitor a way to shortcut research and development,
2 04
In practice, the law of
although the term is not defined in TRIPS.
the country in which the data is to be used typically provides the
20 5
definition of unfair use.
TRIPS also clarifies what type of data are afforded protection
under the agreement by setting out five criteria: (1) the data were
submitted as a condition for obtaining marketing approval for a
product; (2) the product was a pharmaceutical product; (3) the product
was a new chemical entity; (4) the data were disclosed at the time of
submission; and (5) generation of the data required considerable
effort. 206 This approach to clinical test data protection has the
advantage of allowing generic products to reach the market quickly
without
unnecessary
regeneration
of data.2 0 7
Additionally,
implementing this approach is theoretically easy because there is no
208
regulatory burden imposed on the government entity.
However, even this comprehensive agreement left a good amount
of room for interpretation and international variation. TRIPS must be
implemented via statute in each member country, meaning that each
party to the agreement can take its own- approach on how to best
2 09
Some
protect data from unfair use, and how to enforce its provisions.
members have chosen to protect data by enjoining direct reliance on
the data for a certain period of time; others grant originator companies
exclusive marketing rights.2 1 0 It leaves open the possibility of member
states creating exclusions or exceptions to the intellectual property
protections. 2 11 Additionally, TRIPS does not include any specific
requirement for duration of protection against unfair commercial use,
leaving that determination up to the discretion of each member
state. 212 Further, there are several terms in the agreement left
is no clarification of what constitutes a
undefined-there
"pharmaceutical product" or a "new chemical entity," or what level of
21 3
effort is "considerable."

203. Jeffrey K. Francer & Natalie A. Turner, Responsible Clinical Trial Data
Sharing: Medical Advancement, Patient Privacy, and Incentives to Invest in Research, 8
J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 63, 96 (Oct. 2014).
204. See id. at 97.
205. Armouti, supra note 125, at 269.
206. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 120, art. 39.
207. See Armouti, supra note 125, at 270.
208. See id.
209. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 31.
210. Id.
211. IntellectualProperty: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 190.
212. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 31.
213. See generally id. (noting that the agreement does not specify how protections
should be provided).
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IV. THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF COMPREHENSIVE CLINICAL
DATA PROTECTION

It is clear that discord in methods and comprehensiveness in
clinical data protection causes regulatory delays, increases costs, and
leads to unnecessary confusion and duplication of research. 214 The
demand for broad, global reform to standardize how clinical data is
regulated only continues to grow more insistent, especially considering
the potentially life-saving effects of some medications. What is less
clear is exactly what level of protection such broad reform should
espouse. Answering this question requires balancing the desire to
protect the pharmaceutical industry, reward development of drugs
that treat rare diseases, and encourage research of novel compounds
against the need to increase access to necessary drugs and keep costs
affordable for consumers.
In the absence of any clinical data protection, it is likely that
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry would be significantly
dampened. Prohibiting competitors from relying on data generated by
other companies spurs development and testing of new active
ingredients because it allows the originator company time to recoup
the costs of developing an innovative drug. 215 Therefore, there must be
some economic incentives for companies to engage in this risky
business.
Countries with strong protections for clinical data also contribute
significantly to research and development in the pharmaceutical
industry. For example, the United States-which has extensive patent
protections and is a party to several bilateral and multinational
agreements regarding clinical data protection-produced over half of
the world's novel drugs in the early 2000s. 2 16 This may be due to a
potential relationship between spending on research and development,
financial returns, and the length of market exclusivity for a given
product.2 1 7
However, there is fundamental disagreement as to how much
protection, if any, is necessary to protect the pharmaceutical industry
and ensure that new, innovative medications continue to be developed.
It is unclear exactly how long it takes a drug company to recover the
costs of drug development. One study suggests that due to high costs
and the fact that only approximately 12 percent of drugs ever turn a
profit, new biologics require seventeen years of protection, while small
molecule drugs should receive between eleven and thirteen years. 218

214. See supra Parts II & III.
215. See generally Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53 (discussing the potential
injustice an originator may face if a competitor relied on its data before it had the chance
to recoup the resources it expended to develop the data).
216. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 4 (2014),
http://phrma-does.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdfl2014-special-301-submission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GT6K-DS6M] (archived Sept. 15, 2018).
217. Vernon, supra note 142, at 13.
218. See id. at 16.
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Conversely, Doctor Aaron Kesselheim points out that much of the
"important innovation that leads to new drug products is often
performed in academic institutions and supported by investment from
2 19
He also
public sources such as the National Institutes of Health."
argues that the pharmaceutical industry is not nearly as vulnerable as
it makes itself out to be-in reality, biotechnology companies often
2 20
and
have some of the highest revenues of any in the global economy,
the largest pharmaceutical companies consistently see profit margins
between 15 and 20 percent. 221 To support his argument, Kesselheim
cites a Hepatitis C drug called Sovaldi, which recouped almost all its
development costs during its first year on the market, raking in sales
22 2
of over $10 billion.
Some experts argue that high drug prices are actually exacerbated
223
by market exclusivity and other methods of clinical data protection.
grown
has
spending
pharmaceutical
consumer
Although
approximately 30 percent in recent years, the number of drug units
sold has remained essentially the same-this means that
pharmaceutical companies are continuing to raise prices to combat
stagnant sales. 224 During exclusivity periods, there is unlikely to be
competition from a generic version of the drug. There may be another
brand-name manufacturer that developed a similar treatment using
its own data; however, either because physicians often do not consider
drug prices when deciding to prescribe a certain drug, or because of
quasi-collusion among brand-name pharmaceutical developers, this
225
A
competition often does not significantly lower costs to consumers.
specific example of this is Amgen's rheumatoid arthritis drug, Enbrel.
The company received a significant patent extension, and a competitor
drug made by Pfizer was approved. Although this theoretically should
have decreased the cost of the drug for consumers, the average price of
226
This
Enbrel actually increased almost 10 percent the following year.
trend is amplified in countries like the United States that do not

219. Kesselheim, supra note 57, at 863.
220. See id. ("The biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors have for years been
among the very best-performing sectors in the US economy.").
221. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS 18

(2017).
222. Kesselheim, supra note 57, at 864 (citing Andrew Pollack, Sales of Sovaldi,
New Gilead Hepatitis C Drug, Soar to $10.3 Billon, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/business/sales-of-sovaldi-new-gilead-hepatitis-cdrug-soar-to- 10-3-billion.html [https://perma.ce/56YA-4KUR] (archived Sept. 9, 2018)).
223. See id. at 858.
224. Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in
PharmaceuticalMarkets 5 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings,
Working Paper No. 30, 2017).
225. See Kesselheim, supra note 57, at 861.
Drug
226. Stewart Lyman, Would Longer Drug Patents Really Lead to Lower
9
Prices?, XCONOMY (Sept. 5, 2012), https://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2012/0 /05/wouldlonger-drug-patents-really-lead-to-lower-drug-prices/?single-page=true [https://perma.
cc4DQL-777V] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
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directly regulate the cost of pharmaceutical products, even as a
condition for extended patent protection. 227 In fact, prices for the most
common brand-name drugs in the United States increased 164 percent
between 2008 and 2015.228 Additionally, the ability of pharmaceutical
companies to set prices often leads to low- and middle-income countries
paying more for drugs than high-income countries with larger markets
due to a lack of bargaining power.2 29
Comprehensive clinical data protection may also be an effective
way to incentivize companies to develop drugs for rare diseases with
smaller markets. 230 Incentives are necessary because studies have
shown that larger market size and larger potential profit have a
positive correlation with innovation; in the absence of these factors,
innovation may be dampened. 23 1 This problem not only affects drugs
targeting less common diseases, but also reflects the fact that
pharmaceuticals are becoming increasingly specialized-for example,
while in the past a company would develop a drug to treat cancer
generally, advances in medical knowledge and technology have made
it possible to focus on a specific treatment for one type of cancer. 232 The
market for the product is therefore artificially narrowed, decreasing
the potential sales and increasing the burden on the developer to
recover the costs. Without sufficient data protection, pharmaceutical
companies are often hesitant to take the risk of investing in developing
such drugs without a guarantee of .-t least making their money back,
if not turning a profit.2 33 When they do focus on rare conditions, the
prices of the products are often among the most expensive on the
market, sometimes exceeding $250,000 per patient per year. 234
Similarly, strong protection provides a reason for pharmaceutical
companies based in the western world to develop products that benefit
people mainly in developing countries, such as drugs targeting malaria
and other tropical diseases. 235
Another consideration is the effect of data protection on the
generic-drug market. Too much data protection makes it very difficult
for a generic version of a drug to make it to market. 236 Generic
producers must prove not only safety and efficacy of their drug, but
also need to demonstrate that it is essentially an identical copy of the

227. Morton & Boller, supra note 224, at 1.
228. Kesselheim, supra note 57, at 860.
229. Ghebreyesus, supra note 58.
230. See Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 10-11.
231. Richard Frank & Paul B. Ginsburg, PharmaceuticalIndustry Profits and
Research and Development, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.
org/do/10. 1377/hblog20171113.880918/full/
[https://perma.cc/46GL-5JAX]
(archived
Sept. 15, 2018).
232. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 14.
233. See id.
234. Kesselheim, supra note 57, at 860.
235. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 53, at 13.
236. See Joanne Nicholas, OutsourcingClinical Trials, 104 J. NATL CANCER INST.
1043, 1045 (2012).
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237
This requires
non-generic drug before it will be approved for sale.
largely the same drug development process as is required of the
originator pharmaceutical company. 2 38 When the originator company
is allowed to protect the results of its trials as a trade secret or
pursuant to a patent, it forces potential generic producers to duplicate
the same efforts, expending precious money and resources to produce
the same data. 239 Further, any errors committed by the originator
company during the drug development process are likely to be
reproduced, as opposed to avoided, including errors which led to highly
240
detrimental side effects in trial subjects.
In order to avoid these issues, would-be generic producers
typically wait until clinical trial data is no longer protected, at which
point they can rely on the originator data and prove equivalence
without unnecessary duplication. 2 4 ' In terms of consumer access, the
ability of generics to make it to market makes a world of differencefor example, AstraZeneca's cholesterol-controlling drug Crestor
initially sold for approximately $200 for a month's supply; when the
FDA approved generic versions of the drug, the price dropped to $20

for the same number of pills.

242

There are also numerous ethical issues surrounding stringent
clinical data protection. Some academics believe that closely holding
clinical data puts too high a social cost on poor, developing countries
by forcing them to pay exorbitantly high prices for non-generic versions
of drugs.24 3 According to the World Health Organization (WHO),
approximately one-third of the world population does not have access
to necessary medications. 2 44 Even when data protection instruments
do allow for marketing of generic drugs, people in poorer countries still
end up purchasing the name-brand medicine, often because their
2 45
If
country does not have the capacity to develop the generic version.
these populations do have access to generic drugs, it is because they
have paid to import them from other countries, and consumers are
often still not able to afford them, given that up to 90 percent of people
in the developing world must purchase medicines entirely out of
pocket.2 46

237. Id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See Diependaele, supra note 55.
242. Teresa Carr, How the FDA Plans to Lower Your Drug Costs, CONSUMER
REPORTS (July 18, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/how-new-fdaproposals-to-lower-drug-costs-will-affect-youl [https://perma.cclXUY8-H9DS] (archived
Aug. 25, 2018).
243. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 170; Choi, supra note 107; Reichman, supra note 5,
at 4.
244.

WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 61 (2004). What's

more, developing countries often spend up to 60 percent of health care budgets on
medicines. Id. at 45.
245. Cho, supra note 170, at 73.
246. Id.; Ghebreyesus, supra note 58.
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Concerns about access to medication are exemplified by the
HIV/AIDS crisis that especially affected poor, developing countries. 247
Even after medications to treat the disease were approved in highincome countries, they were still unavailable in the countries that
needed them most. In response to this problem, the WTO amended
TRIPS to add Article 31bis, which allowed signatories to issue
"compulsory licenses" requiring pharmaceutical companies to
manufacture and send drugs to developing countries that could not
produce the drugs themselves in emergent situations. 24 8 Although the
amendment was enacted to address the AIDS crisis, the issuance of
compulsory licenses is not limited to any specific disease. 249 That the
WTO went as far as to amend TRIPS to increase flexibility
demonstrates a recent international trend towards decreasing the level
of protection as a general matter.
The drawbacks of clinical data protection coupled with the
concerns of developing countries have led to increased demand for
public transparency of clinical trial data. 250 Some of the loudest voices
calling for relaxed protection for clinical data are developed countries,
which are disproportionately disadvantaged by tight regulation of
proprietary data. Although TRIPS and its stringent protections seem
to represent an international consensus about the proper level of data
protection, the history of the agreement casts doubt on this assertion.
Because TRIPS was negotiated as part of a larger agreement that
established the WTO, some members adopted it as part of a package
where they got concessions in other areas; this means the signatories
did not all necessarily agree on TRIPS' data protection provisions.2 5 1
Certain developing countries have advocated for a more flexible
reading of TRIPS that takes into account public health concerns and
developmental objectives. Their position was eventually backed by
large, powerful organizations such as the UN Development
Programme, the World Bank, and the UK Secretary of State for
International Development. 252 In the early 2000s, WHO started to
encourage such a flexible reading through the Doha Declaration, which
emphasizes the gravity of supporting developing countries' public
health needs, promoting access to necessary medications, and
incentivizing development of new compounds. 25 3 The Doha Declaration
also reminded countries of their broad discretion to issue compulsory

247.

Daniel Gervais, TRIPS and Development, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 95, 100 (2014) [hereinafter SAGE HANDBOOK].

248. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 120, art. 31bis; SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note
247, at 100.
249.

See SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 247, at 100.

250. See Choi, supra note 107, at 251.
251. See Gervais State of Play, supranote 194, at 507-09.
252. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data
Exclusivity and Patent/RegistrationLinkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 319 (2008).
253.

SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 247; Zimmerman, supra note 132, at 804; World

Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
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licenses. 2 54 Today, WHO is vocal about the need to avoid "bad" trade
agreements that prevent access to innovative technologies and
affordable medication for vulnerable populations-that "patients must
always come before patents."2 55
The most dramatic of these demands for transparency in recent
years is the Declaration of Helsinki, originally adopted in 1964 and
amended in 2000, calling for complete disclosure of all clinical trial
data in response to perceived human rights violations perpetrated by
clinical trial sponsors. 256 Some scholars have even asserted that
clinical data should be considered a public good available to all because
the funds for clinical trials are supplied by pharmaceutical companies
who receive large public subsidies. 2 57 Pharmaceutical companies, it is
argued, must be held accountable for the quality of their research, and
requiring disclosure of clinical trial data would increase such
accountability to consumers. 258 Complete disclosure would "promote
259
research integrity, medical knowledge, and public health."
Additionally, if clinical data were considered a public good, it would be
freely available, not only to the FDA, but also to physicians, medical
schools, insurers, scholars, patients, and other research institutions,
260
all of whom could put the data to productive use.

V. SOLUTION

While the current instruments to protect clinical data all have
certain benefits, it is also clear that none are perfect solutions to the
problem. Currently, there is not one comprehensive data protection
instrument that successfully balances the need to incentivize
pharmaceutical companies to innovate with the ethical duties to
provide affordable medical treatment to all people for all diseases, if

254. Baker, supra note 252, at 320.
255. Ghebreyesus, supra note 58.
256. World Med. Ass'n, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects, T 36, (June 1964), https://www.wma.net/policiespost/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involvinghuman-subjects/ [ https://perma.cc/Y4W4-WT48] (archived Oct. 11, 2018) ("Researchers
have a duty to make publicly available the results of their research on human subjects
and are accountable for the completeness and accuracy of their reports."); see Choi, supra
note 107, at 521-22; Anushya Vijayananthan, The Importance of Good ClinicalPractice
Guidelines and Its Role in Clinical Trials, 4 BIOMEDICAL IMAGING INTERVENTION J. 1, 1

(2008). Note that when these articles advocate for complete transparency of clinical trial
data, they are truly asking for disclosure of Clinical Study Reports, which summarize
clinical trials, describe the methods, and analyze some of the data. This is not the same
as advocating for complete abandonment of protection through patents, trade secrets, or
market exclusivity, but rather is an alternative view on how results of clinical trials
should be treated. Marc A. Rodwin & John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Dataas a Public
Good, 308 JAMA 871, 872 (2012).
257. Rodwin & Abramson, supra note 256, at 872.
258. See Choi, supra note 107, at 523.
259. Rodwin & Abramson, supra note 256, at 871.
260. Id.
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possible. Additionally, while there has been an overall move toward
global harmonization of data protection, there are still countless
instruments governing clinical data transparency internationally.
Even under a single instrument, member states are often allowed
significant leeway in interpreting data protection requirements,
undermining the goal of harmonization. As detailed in Part II, the need
for such harmonization only continues to grow more pressing.
To ensure that all countries involved in pharmaceutical
development reap the benefits of clinical data protection, some type of
standardized global regime is necessary. What is less clear is whether
that regime should be one of extreme protection, extreme
transparency, or somewhere in the middle. In the end, the calculus
boils down to weighing the ethical and economic ramifications of
comprehensive clinical data protection against the ethical and
economic ramifications of allowing greater transparency and access to
clinical data. This is a complicated calculation because it essentially
involves balancing trade law, which is largely pragmatic and profit
focused, with human rights law, which is often more theoretical. 26 1
However, given that major pharmaceutical companies are actually
seeing profits significantly larger than those of most other industries
and the lack of clarity about the actual length of time it takes to recoup
drug development costs, the concerns of the drug development industry
appear to be outweighed by ethical concerns about access to affordable
medications and the need to foster development in poorer countries.
Knowledge is a "nonrival" industry-there is no way to exhaust it, even
if multiple people use it. 262 Because of this, the goal of clinical data
protection should be to maximize access to knowledge in order to
benefit global public health at the lowest cost possible. 263 The
pharmaceutical industry is powerful and has convinced the world it
needs more protection than it actually does. As such, the true solution
to the problem is to find a way to scale back the level of clinical data
protection as a general matter, while attempting to harmonize
protection on a global scale.
A. Data Exclusivity as the Gold Standardfor ClinicalData Protection
The first issue is which intellectual property tool is the most
appropriate to protect clinical data, regardless of the level of protection.
There are several drawbacks to patents in the context of incentivizing
drug development that make them ill-suited to protect clinical data.
First, patents only protect the particular product, not necessarily the
data used to generate that product, meaning they are not a good fit for

261.

Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Propertyand Human Rights: Learning to Live

Together, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7 (2008).

&

262. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and
Innovation in InternationalPrescriptionDrug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L.
ETHICS 193, 199 (2005).
263. Id. at 217.
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ensuring generic manufacturers do not free ride on the originator
company's data.2 64 The patent system is also relatively inefficient, both
in terms of time and cost. An originator company must take affirmative
steps to receive patent protections-namely, it must expend the effort
to file a patent application, and the regulatory agency must consider
26 5
the application and ultimately grant or deny the patent.
Additionally, enforcement of patent rights often requires seeking relief
from a court after the patent holder's rights have been violated, which
can be costly. 266
Instead, the most fitting form of protection is data exclusivity,
which was designed to promote new drug innovation while still
2 67
Data exclusivity therefore
allowing public access to generic drugs.
offers a good deal of flexibility, which is important if we believe that
perhaps blanket, uniform clinical data protection does not properly
complexities of the pharmaceutical industry.
address the
Implementing a system based in data exclusivity would be made easier
by the fact that most industrialized countries already frequently use
data exclusivity to a certain extent: Japan, Australia, the EU, and the
268
United States all have some data exclusivity laws in place currently.
Further, the system of enforcement is generally efficient. Because
data exclusivity results from inaction of a government agency-that is,
the regulatory agency is prohibited from granting approval for generic
versions of drugs for a specified amount of time-it is relatively easy to
administer. 269 The beneficiary of the exclusivity does not have to take
270
What's more,
any affirmative action to receive the protections.
unlike patents, which are litigated constantly, government inaction
such as is found in data exclusivity is much more difficult to
challenge. 27 1 This means the costs of administering such a system are
272
significantly lower than a patent-based system.
In order to properly accommodate the competing interests, the
ideal system of protection would be based solely on data exclusivity,
and would override individual countries' patent and trade-secret laws
in this particular arena. Because these intellectual property tools are
currently allowed to coexist when it comes to data protection, the
ultimate goal of having less protection as a general matter is
undermined if a product is also protected by another mechanism.

264. See supra Part III.A.
265. See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological
Pharmaceuticals-DoWe Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELEcOMM. TECH. L. REV. 419,
451 (2012).
266. Id. at 431.
267. FDA FAQ, supra note 136.
268. Robert Weissman, Public Health-Friendly Options for Protecting
PharmaceuticalRegistrationData, 1 INT'L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 1, 2 (2006).
269. See Heled, supra note 265, at 432.
270. See id. at 455.
271. See id.
272. Id.
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However, accomplishing this feat on a global scale is likely not possible,
and it is beyond the scope of this Note to explore in further detail.
B. A Hybrid Approach: Pro Rata Data Exclusivity and Cost Sharing
The next problem to solve is what level of protection should be
adopted on an international scale. Addressing this issue is not simple,
but it is clear that the answer does not lie in merely offering protection
for a set period of time, as is common today-as one scholar noted, a
"one size fits all" approach is rarely workable in all situations.2 7 3
Rather, the calculus needs to account for the effort and money actually
expended by a pharmaceutical company to produce the data. Only then
does clinical data protection come close to allowing companies to
recover necessary costs without unduly deterring competition and
burdening less developed countries disproportionately.
As such, this Note proposes a two-part, hybrid scheme to protect
clinical data. First, the originator company receives one year of
traditional data exclusivity after obtaining marketing approval, during
which no generic manufacturer may rely on the originator's data. After
the year is up, a cost-sharing system takes over, allowing generic
competitors to rely on the originator's data for a price proportionate to
the actual cost of generating the data. 274 The cost-sharing system

endures for an additional four years, at which point the data become
publicly available to anyone.
The first stage functions much as data exclusivity currently
functions under TRIPS and other similar agreements. The beneficiary
of the exclusivity does not need to take any affirmative action in order
to receive protection. Rather, exclusivity attaches automatically, with
each country's regulatory agency prohibited from giving approval to a
competitor drug that relies on the originator data for a period of one
year. The benefits of this are twofold-first, it is a system with which
developed countries are already familiar, and to which they are partial.
Second, providing a standard, nonnegotiable period of protection would
assure pharmaceutical companies that they would have at least a year
to recoup costs without significant competition on the market. Given
that most pharmaceutical companies are located in powerful,
industrialized nations, it is important to have them on board to
implement any new global scheme.
The second phase, cost sharing, requires a generic company to
fairly compensate the originator company for the right to rely on its
data. In order to accomplish "fair" compensation, the originator
company must document its actual costs incurred to generate the data,
and disclose those costs to the national regulatory agency. To best

273. See Weissman, supra note 268, at 3.
274. While not currently used by any countries in the drug development arena, the
cost-sharing approach has been advocated for by several scholars as a better way to
advance public health goals while still promoting innovation. See, e.g., Armouti, supra
note 125, at 271-75; Weissman, supra note 268, at 8-12.
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facilitate the process, originator companies must provide these
disclosures with their materials for initial market approval. In that
way, any disputes over expenditures may be able to be resolved before
the cost-sharing period begins, allowing efficient entry of generic
products into the market.
Once the cost is disclosed and the cost-sharing period commences,
any generic company wishing to rely on the originator data must pay a
portion of that cost. The cost to share in the data depends on the size
of the market the generic company plans to enter, and the number of
generic competitors relying on the data.
To illustrate, assume a company obtains approval to market a
drug.2 7 5 It discloses that it spent $100 million to generate the data
needed to bring the drug to market. If a generic competitor wanted to
rely on that data to market a drug in Saudi Arabia, which represents
2 76
it must pay 1 percent
1 percent of the global pharmaceutical market,
of the originator company's costs spread out over the four-year costsharing period-$1 million in total, or $250,000 per year. Now assume
the same generic company wanted to market the drug in China, a
country that comprises 10 percent of the global market. The generic
manufacturer would be responsible for paying 10 percent of the
originator's costs, amounting to $10 million in total, or $2.5 million
each year.
These costs would be defrayed both by additional generic
competitors entering the market around the same time as the
originator company, and by generic companies entering the market
later in the four-year cost-sharing period. If a second generic
manufacturer also enters the Saudi Arabian market relying on the
originator company's data, the annual costs for both generic companies
are cut in half, because there is another actor to share the costs.
Additionally, generic companies are only responsible for the annual
payments: if a generic manufacturer entered the Saudi Arabian
market two years into the cost-sharing period, it would only have to
pay $500,000-for the remaining two years of the cost-sharing period
at $250,000 annually-rather than the $1 million total fee.
In order to ensure that originator companies are not needlessly
overcompensated, there are additional caps on how much the
originator may recoup. This Note proposes that once the originator
company has recovered fifteen times what it cost to develop the drug,
the cost-sharing period ends, even if that occurs before the typical fouryear term. A fifteen-fold return on investment is more than even the
most successful pharmaceutical companies can boast currently-for
example, in 2013, Pfizer, a large, US-based drug company, spent

275. Credit for the following illustration goes to Robert Weissman. Weissman,
supra note 268, at 8.
276. Share of pharmaceutical revenue worldwide in 2017, by country, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.comlstatistis/784420/share-of-worldwide-pharma-revenue-bycountry/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8JBJ-2SQC] (archived Aug. 25,
2018).
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$6.6 billion on research and development, while its total revenue was
$51.6 billion, less than an eight-fold return. 27 7 Such a cap would allow
pharmaceutical companies to adequately compensate for research
costs for products that did not make it to market.
This hybrid system may seem novel, but it is not wholly unheard
of. The United States uses a combination of data exclusivity and cost
sharing for approval of agricultural chemicals in the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 278 Under FIFRA,
covered chemicals receive ten years of exclusivity, during which the
underlying data may not be relied on by other parties who want to
register the same chemical with the Environmental Protection
Agency. 2 79 For the next ten years, generic competitors may rely on the
originator's data for a fee. 280 This system has successfully been in place
since 1975, and has generally run smoothly. 28 1
This proposed hybrid scheme has several benefits and resolves
many outstanding issues with clinical data protection. Currently,
clinical data is often protected longer than is truly necessary to recover
costs and incentivize innovation. Regardless of exactly how long it
takes for a pharmaceutical company to begin to profit on a particular
product, it is obvious that indiscriminately offering the same amount
of protection to all clinical data necessarily means sometimes offering
too much protection. By offering a set period of pure data exclusivity
followed by a tailored cost-sharing system, originator companies are
only compensated as much as they need to be.
Further, the burden of fairly compensating the originator is
shared between multiple generic companies, eliminating monopolies
and passing fewer costs to the consumer. The cost to generic
manufacturers to rely on the originators' data is relatively modest
when compared to the cost of developing a drug from start to finish,
which can be as high as $53 million. 282 Allowing generic companies
affordable access to originator data after one year means generic drugs
will make it to market much sooner and much more affordably than
under the current system, increasing access to affordable and
necessary medications in developing countries. And importantly, this
scheme accomplishes all this with an easy-to-administer system
through which the beneficiary need take no action other than properly
disclosing its costs when applying for market approval.

277. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceuticalindustry gets high on fat profits, BBC
(Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223 [https://perma.cc/25F98NQ7] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
278. Weissman, supra note 268, at 9.
279. Id.; Pesticide Registration Manual: Chapter 10-Data Compensation
Requirements,

U.S.
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AGENCY,

https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-

registration/pesticide-registration-manual-chapter- 10-data-compensationrequirements#FIFRA (last visited Sept. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EJR7-ZSBP]
(archived Aug. 26, 2018).
280. Weissman, supra note 268, at 9.
281. Id.
282. Sertkaya, supra note 42.
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Some may argue that this system would lead to bad incentives for
pharmaceutical companies. Just like lawyers may be tempted to run
up legal costs if they get paid by the hour, drug developers may see a
benefit to delaying drug development or spending more money than
necessary in order to receive higher compensation from generic
competitors for their clinical data. However, under the cost-sharing
scheme, there is no real incentive to artificially inflate costs, because
the originator company can only recoup up to fifteen times what it
spent. The one-year data exclusivity period might allow the originator
to recover some of the artificially high costs, but not enough to
encourage companies to intentionally spend more money. There is also
the additional pressure of the economic market-if a company spends
an exorbitant amount during drug development, it will need to charge
more for its product to ensure it will recover its costs. The originator
company cannot rely entirely on the cost-sharing mechanism, because
there is no guarantee that any generic company will want to rely on its
data. Should a competitor enter the market without having to rely on
the originator's data, and the competitor is able to price its product
more affordably, the free market will punish the higher-priced
medicine.
Additionally, clinical data protection essentially only applies to
products that are successful. There is significantly reduced need to
shield data that stemmed from a product that was ultimately never
approved. Because so few compounds actually make it to market,
pharmaceutical companies would be playing a very dangerous game if
they chose to artificially inflate costs of developing all their drugs in
the hopes of longer protection for the data generated in creating the
rare successful drug.
C. How Do We Get There?
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to delve too deeply into
the exact mechanism by which this system would be accomplished on
a global level, it is worth at least noting the most likely options for
implementation.
Currently, treaties are the most common method of accomplishing
harmonization on a global scale. Large, international agreements allow
all potential members to have a voice about the terms of the agreement.
They also require parties to affirmatively express "consent to be
bound," or willingness to undertake and comply with all obligations set
out by the treaty.2 83 This not only creates a sense of ownership in the
terms of the treaty, but it also leaves no room for ambiguity as to
whether a country agrees to its contents.

283. U.N., FACT SHEET #5: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008),
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2008/Press kit/fact sheet_5_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2ST-R84B] (archived Sept. 15, 2018).
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However, treaties also have several drawbacks that make them
unsuitable to the global clinical data protection context. First and most
importantly, data exclusivity turns on a decision by the regulatory
authority in the country in which the drug will be marketed, rather
than on the laws of the country where the clinical trial was conducted.
This decreases the force and effectiveness of an international treaty,
because each country's regulatory authority must ultimately decide
whether to implement the hybrid system. Second, the fact that all
members of a treaty get to participate in negotiations often leads to
watered-down terms in order to appease the largest number of
actors. 284 Further, for a treaty to be effective, member nations must
actually ratify and enforce it.2 8 5

Despite these downsides, it may be that the best way to
accomplish implementation of the proposed solution is through
amending the TRIPS agreement. Although the actual agreement in its
current form does not reach the right balance of incentivizing
innovation and allowing access to affordable medication, it is still a
good place to start because it is linked to the WTO. There are already
164 members of the WTO, representing over 96 percent of global trade
and global gross domestic product. 2 86 Should all 164 WTO members
adopt the TRIPS amendment, achieving global harmonization through
universal adoption of the hybrid system would be much closer to
accomplished.
For many developing countries that are not already party to
TRIPS, the relaxed data protection alone may be sufficient to spur
becoming a member. In light of the recent call by developing countries
for a more flexible reading of TRIPS, a standardized system of
protection that is overall more permissive would likely seem preferable
to the more stringent protections already in place. Further, the costsharing element of the hybrid system would probably not be a
deterrent to developing countries because they are generally not home
to either originator or generic pharmaceutical companies. While this
proposal may raise the price of generic drugs, it would increase general
availability of medicines and would expand innovation into less
common or profitable diseases, allowing more access to necessary
medications in developing nations.
The hybrid approach may even appease developed countries.
Although the level of data protection would decrease as a general
matter, offering a set period of data exclusivity would still assure
originator pharmaceutical companies, which are largely based in
industrialized nations, that they would at least have some time to
recoup costs. The cost-sharing aspect would ensure that even if generic
drugs were able to make it to market sooner, the originator company

284. John 0. McGinnis, The Comparative Disadvantage of Customary
InternationalLaw, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 9 (2007).
285. Id.
286. Accession in perspective, supra note 198; see also Members and Observers,
supra note 110.
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would still be fairly compensated. Additionally, developed nations may
be enticed by the potential cost savings that would accompany a
completely standardized regime.
For those countries that are not persuaded merely by the terms of
the agreement, there are several possible mechanisms for incentivizing
membership without unduly coercing potential signatories. For
example, the agreement could contain a stipulation that all member
countries will not conduct any clinical research within a country if the
potential host country is not party to the agreement. This would likely
convince nations where the cost of conducting clinical trials is still low,
because they are currently benefitting from the influx of money and
technology that accompanies such research. The agreement could also
require all member states to impose severe market repercussions, such
as high taxes, on all drugs manufactured by a pharmaceutical country
based in a nonmember country. Such a provision would be highly
influential to developed countries with a large presence in the
pharmaceutical industry who may be more reluctant to accept
decreased protection for clinical data.

VI. CONCLUSION

Appropriately protecting clinical data is a complex problem that
requires marrying very different areas of the law. Trade law,
intellectual property law, international law, and human rights law
have distinct goals that may seem hard, if not impossible, to reconcile.
The current clinical data protection regime does not adequately
address this issue-not only is there currently significant variation in
the mechanisms and amount of clinical data protection internationally,
undermining the goals of providing protection in the first place, there
is also little consideration of normative and ethical concerns stemming
from overprotection. In order to join all these disparate interests into
one cohesive system, the "one size fits all" method of offering the same
amount of clinical data protection regardless of the time or effort spent
to produce the data must be abandoned. A hybrid system that combines
a standard period of data exclusivity with a cost-sharing approach
attempts to address the flaws in the current scheme by properly
balancing the need to incentivize innovation with the need for access
to medication. It capitalizes on the fact that knowledge is nonrivalthat an unlimited number of people can benefit from it at the same
time without it being depleted-while still adequately compensating
those companies that expend resources to generate such knowledge.
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Although such disparate philosophies may seem at odds, the hybrid
system creates a global regime that truly is the best of both worlds.
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